This paper introduces the Nash Inequality Ratio (NIR) as a natural characterization of the extent to which inequality is permitted between individual agents in Nash equilibrium outcomes of a given strategic setting. For any particular strategy, the inequality ratio is defined as the ratio between the highest and lowest costs incurred to individual agents in the outcome dictated by that strategy. The NIR of a game is defined as the maximal inequality ratio over all Nash equilibrium strategy profiles. It indicates quantitatively how intrinsically fair (or unfair) a game can be for the agents involved. Moreover, the NIR allows us to quantify the relationship between efficiency and (in)equality, by establishing whether there exist efficient Nash equilibrium outcomes that maximize and/or minimize the inequality ratio.
Introduction
Game theory uses the concept of equilibria to capture the idea that, in a competitive world, rational agents will maneuver themselves to a point from which no further maneuvering will yield unto them any additional benefits (e.g., a lower cost). The most well known of these is the Nash equilibria, which applies when no single agent can achieve a lower cost by changing their strategy given that the strategies of every other agent remain unchanged. In a Nash equilibrium there often exists a disparity between the costs incurred by individual agents, with the more fortunate agents subjected to lower costs. We introduce the Nash Inequality Ratio (NIR), defined as the maximum ratio between the highest and lowest costs found within any single Nash equilibrium, as a quantity to capture the extent to which cost disparity between individual agents arises in a strategic setting.
The NIR is a quantity similar in spirit to the well-known Price of Anarchy (PoA), which considers the ratio between social costs of worst-case Nash equilibria and the socially efficient outcomes (which are not necessarily themselves Nash equilibria) [KP99, KP09] ; see also [Dub86] for an earlier treatment of a similar concept. Intuitively, the PoA characterizes the extent that decentralized, self-interested decision making (i.e., anarchy) is worse for society than the outcomes dictated by a centralized authority. In contrast, the NIR pertains to the decentralized scenario alone and characterizes the scale of disparity between the self-interested decision makers (i.e., anarchists) on an individual level.
A NIR analysis can deliver new, fundamental insights into a strategic scenario. Because of the ubiquitous focus on the PoA within the algorithmic game theory community, the social cost of equilibria is often the only quantity used to evaluate the quality of outcomes, and the distribution of this cost among individuals gets lost in the aggregate. We contend that establishing bounds on the discrepancies that arise between individuals' costs in equilibrium is necessary in evaluating the quality of an outcome, especially in settings where fairness 1 and equality are both important. This paper analyzes inequality for network formation games -specifically, the Undirected Connections (UC) game of Fabrikant et . In both games, there is a set of strategic agents, N = {1, . . . , n}. Each agent i ∈ N chooses a linking strategy s i ∈ S i that represents the subset of agents that i is interested in building an edge to, and S i denotes the set of all possible strategies for agent i. A joint strategy profile s = (s 1 , . . . , s n ) ∈ S 1 × · · · × S n = S induces an undirected network G s = (N, E s ) where the agents are represented in G s by vertices and the edge set is the union of all those built by the agents; i.e., E s = {{i, j} : j ∈ s i }. Since an edge {i, j} is include in E s if either j ∈ s i or i ∈ s j , edge formation is said to be unilateral.
The UC and UBBC games differ in how the "cost" of adding edges is accounted for. In the UC game, given a joint strategy s, each agent i ∈ N incurs a two-part cost, made up of an usage cost defined to be the sum of shortest-path distances between the agent and all others, and a construction cost that is equal to the number of edges the agent builds multiplied by a constant α > 0. In the UBBC game, each agent i ∈ N is endowed with an edge budget k i > 0, restricting the size of i's strategy (i.e., the number of links that i can build) to at most k i . The cost to an agent i given a joint strategy s in the UBBC game is identical to the usage cost in the UC game.
Our Results
The main results presented in this paper involve establishing upper-bounds on the NIR for the UC and UBBC network formation games. In Section 3, the NIR is established for the UC model parameterized by different ranges of α. It is shown that (i) when α < 1, the NIR is at most 1 + α; (ii) when 1 ≤ α < 2, the NIR is at most 2; and (iii) when 2 ≤ α, the NIR is at most 2 + α. The arguments used in establishing these bounds are largely about answering the question: Who is paying for the edges? This is answered by considering different "allocations" of feasible construction costs for the equilibrium and efficient outcomes characterized by [FLM + 03] (cf., Proposition 1). For the UBBC model, it is shown in Section 4 that the NIR is upper-bounded by 2, even in the case that budgets are uniform (i.e., when k i = k for all i ∈ N ). This upper-bound is established by examining the structure of joint strategies, showing that if an agent experiences a cost more than twice that of any other agent then the joint strategy can not be a Nash equilibrium.
The relationship between efficiency and (in)equality is explored by determining whether there exist efficient, Nash equilibrium outcomes that maximize and/or minimize the inequality ratio. A strategy profile s is efficient if it minimizes the social cost C(s) = i∈N c i (s). For the UC model it is shown that (i) when α < 1, there exist efficient Nash equilibrium that maximize inequality and others that achieve perfect equality; (ii) when 1 ≤ α < 2, there exist Nash equilibrium that achieve perfect equality but no Nash equilibrium is efficient; and (iii) when 2 ≤ α, there exist efficient Nash equilibrium with perfect equality but no efficient Nash equilibrium that maximizes inequality. Likewise, for the UBBC model it is shown that when edge budgets are sufficiently large, there are efficient Nash equilibrium strategies that achieve perfect equality; and when edge budgets are sufficiently small, there are efficient Nash equilibrium strategies that achieve the maximal inequality ratio. These results stand in contrast to the conventional wisdom among economists that equality comes at the expense of efficiency (cf., the discussion in Baland and Platteau [BP97] and Bowles [Bow12] ). Indeed, our results show that sometimes the exact opposite is true! Thus we use NIR for two purposes. First, to evaluate intrinsic fairness of a game and second to quantify the relationship between equality to individual agents and efficiency to society of strategic outcomes.
Related Work
We briefly review related literature on inequality in Section 1.2.1 and network formation games in Section 1.2.2.
Inequality
The topic of inequality has been studied for more than a century within the economics and social science communities, and has recently become a matter of increasing interest in the public discourse [Sti12] . This has furthered scholars' understanding of a number of phenomena -from the causes and effects of wealth disparity among individuals and groups [Bow12] , to identifying conditions that give rise to stable cooperative relationships between nations [Mao10] . However, in the algorithmic game theory literature, inequality and (payoff/cost) fairness have received very little attention (cf., [Rou02, LPR + 08] for two examples).
We must stress that the inequality with which we are concerned in this paper pertains to the characteristics inherent to the strategic model in question; we are not addressing notions of inequality relating to developmental economics (cf., [BP97, BP98] ) or socio-economic disparity and poverty (cf., [CAJ04, DA06, CAJ07] ) used to explain how disparity between groups is sustained and/or mitigated. Our concern in this paper is with inequality that is a consequence of the strategic interaction inherent to the game itself -namely, the inequality in individual costs/payoffs at equilibrium -testifying the extent to which the game can be inherently unfair.
There exist examples of inequality metrics in the economics literature, perhaps the most famous being the Gini coefficient (GC) [Gin12] , which measures the dispersion of wealth among a population of individuals. It is defined as GC = A/(A + B) where A is the area sandwiched below the Lorenz curve corresponding to perfect equality (e.g., the 45-degree slope) and above the Lorenz curve reflecting the actual wealth of the given population, and B is the area below the latter Lorenz curve of the population (see Figure 1) . 2 When GC = 0, the wealth is equally distributed, and as GC → 1 the inequality becomes maximized.
With respect to network formation games, the literature addressing inequality is quite sparse. We are aware of only one paper that establishes an inequality upper-bound of the sort described by the NIR; Laoutaris et al. [LPR + 08] provide a lemma showing that, in the directed version of the Bounded Budget network formation game with uniform budgets k > 0, the cost to any agent is at most 2 + 1/k + o(1) times that of any other agent. 3 They did not formalize this notion of inequality, making it applicable across games, as we do here. Furthermore, the majority of network formation papers addressing inequality focus on showing simply that inequality exists rather than establishing any upper-or lower-bounds. The papers by Goyal and Joshi [GJ06] 4 and Hojman and Szeidl [HS08] 5 serve as representative examples. In both papers, the authors establish that certain agents (usually those with high centrality) receive higher payoffs (equivalently, lower costs) than others, but they stop short of establishing any bounds on payoff differences. We posit that such bounds are not suited to the level of abstraction employed in [GJ06, HS08] (and much of the related literature) where the authors' interests are in characterizing outcomes for families of utility functions (e.g., strictly increasing, convex, concave, etc.) rather than specific ones (e.g., sums-of-distances between nodes, etc.).
More recently, Kets, Iyengar, Sethi, and Bowles [KISB11] studied a form of inequality for a cooperative network game based on the notion of Lorenz domination. In a cooperative game, agents must allocate some amount of "value" among themselves. An allocation x = (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ) ∈ R n specifies the amount allocated to each agent i ∈ N . Given two allocations x, y ∈ R n such that i x i = i y i , we say that x Lorenz dominates y if, for every m ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n},
y i with strict inequality for at least one m. If an allocation x Lorenz dominates y it has valuations that are more evenly distributed among the agents and hence more equal. Indeed, one idea that we propose for future work is to extend the NIR toward a metric similar to the Gini coefficient [Gin12] or Lorenz domination which considers the distribution of costs over all agents, instead of simply the relation between the best off and worst off individuals.
Network Formation Games
Network formation games have received considerable attention from researchers in economics and theoretical computer science alike; see the surveys [Goy07, Jac08] 3 In Section 4 we examine inequality in the undirected variant of the Bounded Budget game. 4 Goyal and Joshi discuss the payoff inequality incurred to agents in the Playing the Field game (which can model research collaborations between firms) and the Local Spillovers game; see [GJ06] for details.
5 Hojman and Szeidl [HS08] examine the inequality in a model of network formation in which the utility of an individual agent is dependent upon the network distance to other agents (vis-à-vis [JW96, BG00]).
(PoA). Subsequently, a number of papers have been concerned with tightening bounds on the PoA (and the related Price of Stability (PoS) -the ratio between the lowest social cost incurred in Nash equilibrium and the social cost of an efficient outcome [ADKET04] ) in the UC game and its variations (cf., [AEED + 06, DHMZ07, ADHL10, MS10]).
The second network formation game explored in this paper is the Undirected Bounded Budget Connections (UBBC) game recently studied by Ehsani et al. [FLM + 03] in that they remove the reliance on a construction cost α; instead, each agent i in the bounded budget framework is endowed with a non-negative endowment of k i edges that it can use to establish connectivity. In both [LPR + 08] and [EFM + 11], the authors' primary objective was on establishing bounds on the PoA.
The Nash Inequality Ratio
In this section we formally define the Nash Inequality Ratio as a general metric that can be applied to a given strategic setting, and then used to quantify the greatest possible disparity between individuals in a Nash equilibrium. Consider a game Γ = N, (S i ), (c i ) where N = {1, 2, . . . , n} is the set of players/agents, S i is the strategy space defined for each agent i ∈ N , and c i : S → R is a cost function mapping joint strategy profiles to real numbers. 6 A joint strategy profile s = (s 1 , . . . , s n ) ∈ S 1 × S 2 × · · · × S n = S is a Nash equilibrium if, for every agent i ∈ N and all deviations
In words, a strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium if no single agent stands to lower their cost by switching to another strategy given that every other agent's strategy remains fixed.
Let S eq ⊆ S denote the set of Nash equilibrium strategy profiles for the game Γ. For a strategy profile s ∈ S eq , let c max (s) and c min (s) refer to the maximum and minimum costs incurred by agents under s. The inequality ratio for s is defined as ρ N (s) = c max (s)/c min (s). The Nash Inequality Ratio (NIR) is defined to be the maximal inequality ratio over all Nash strategy profiles S eq ;
The Undirected Connections Game
In this section we analyze the inequality of the Undirected Connections (UC) network formation game introduced by Fabrikant et al.
[FLM + 03]. 8 Section 3.1 formally presents the UC model and Section 3.2 presents our results pertaining to this model.
Model
An instance of the Undirected Connections game is specified by the tuple N, α where N = {1, 2, . . . , n} is a finite set of strategic agents and α > 0 is a constant which determine the cost of adding a single edge. Each agent i ∈ N chooses a strategy s i ∈ S i = P(N \ {i}) that specifies the set of of neighbors j with whom i wants to build links {i.j}. 9 A joint strategy profile s = (s 1 , . . . , s n ) specifies an undirected network
Each agent incurs a cost that includes a usage cost equal to the sum of (shortest-path) distances between themselves and every other agent; and a creation cost proportional to the number of edges that the agent contributes to G s . Formally, the cost to an agent i ∈ N given the joint strategy profile s is defined to be
where ℓ Gs (i, j) denotes the length of the shortest i ↔ j path in
The social cost of a joint strategy profile s is defined to be the sum of the individual costs incurred by the agents; C(s) = i∈N c i (s). A strategy profile that minimizes C(s) is called social efficient or optimal.
Proposition 1 summarizes some of the basic observations made in [FLM + 03] regarding the topologies of efficient and equilibrium outcomes for different values of α. The three regimes for α will inform our analysis of the UC's NIR in what follows. 1. When α < 1 then the complete graph is both efficient and the only Nash equilibrium.
2. When 1 ≤ α < 2 then the complete graph is efficient but the star is the only Nash equilibrium.
3. When α ≥ 2 the star is efficient and a Nash equilibrium, although there are other Nash equilibrium outcomes as well.
Results
Our results for the Undirected Connections network formation game are spread across three subsections, corresponding to each of the three regimes of edge creation cost α highlighted in Proposition 1.
In the following subsections we establish inequality bounds for three ranges of α. We also get the following corollaries on the relationship between inequality and efficiency: (i) when α < 1 there are efficient Nash equilibria that achieve maximal inequality and there are other efficient Nash equilibria in which all agents incur the same cost; (ii) when 1 ≤ α < 2 there are only inefficient Nash equilibria, some of which maximize inequality while others minimize inequality; and (iii) when 2 ≤ α the only efficient Nash equilibria are those that do not maximize inequality. Analysis of regime (i) shows that efficiency and equality can be independent features. Analysis of regime (iii), in contrast, establishes a rich relationship between equality, efficiency and the cost of resources as discussed in detail in the Conclusion section.
3.2.1 When α < 1 Theorem 1. The NIR of UC network formation game instances N, α when α < 1 is upper-bounded by 1 + α.
Proof. It was shown in [FLM + 03] that whenever α < 1 then any Nash equilibrium s ∈ S eq has a diameter of 1, implying that every agent is adjacent to the n − 1 other agents. Therefore, usage costs for the max-cost and min-cost agents are the same, and the only (potential) discrepancy in their costs are with respect to their construction cost. In the most extreme case, the min-cost agent does not buy any of their links and the max-cost agent buys |s max | > 0 links. It follows then that the inequality ratio is
where the cardinality of s max is at most n − 1 (i.e., the agent buys all of their incident links). The proposition follows.
Proposition 2. The minimal inequality ratio for an instance N, α of the UC network formation game when α < 1 is 1 as |N | → ∞.
Proof. Since the only Nash equilibrium outcome when α < 1 is the complete graph, we would get perfect equality among the agents' costs if they all build the same number of edges. This can be achieves if ∀i ∈ N , |s i | = (n − 1)/2. The inequality ratio would be (n−1)+α|smax| (n−1)+α|s min | = 1 since |s max | = |s min |.
From Theorem 1 and Proposition 2 we get the following corollary:
Corollary 1. When α < 1, the UC network formation game admits efficient Nash equilibria that either maximize inequality or achieve perfect equality.
When
The following lemma characterizes the maximum inequality ratio to be found in star topologies. Lemma 1. In the limit as |N | → ∞, the maximal inequality in a star topology for the UC network formation game for any constant α > 0 is max 2, 1 + α 2 .
Proof. Let s ⋆ be a strategy profile that produces a star topology. Suppose that k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n − 1} is the number of edges that the central agent in the star, c, purchases. When k = 0 then we get the peripheral-sponsored star, and when k = n − 1 we get the center-sponsored star. If k < n − 1 then ∃j ∈ N such that c j (s ⋆ ) = 2n − 3 + α, meaning that j had to purchase the edge {j, c}. Similarly, when k > 0 then ∃i ∈ N such that c i (s ⋆ ) = 2n − 3, meaning that c covered the cost of the edge {c, i}. Partition the set of agents N into three sets:
• N c = {c} is the singleton consisting of the central agent;
• N $ is the set of agents j ∈ N \ {c} who purchase the edge {j, c}; and
• N f is the set of free-loading agents who do not buy any edges.
Clearly, |N f | = k since the free-loaders connected to c at c's expense. All agents within a particular part are cost-equivalent, so the cost to an agent i given the joint strategy profile s ⋆ is
It will always be the case that agents in N f incur lower costs than agents in N $ . Agents in N c ∪ N f all incur the same cost when k = n−2 α , so the inequality ratio in this case is 2n
Likewise, when k = n−2 α + 1, agents in N c ∪ N $ incur equivalent costs, so the inequality ratio is again captured by Equation (3).
When k > n−2 α + 1, agents in N c incur the highest cost, agents in N f incur the lowest costs, and the inequality ratio is n − 1 + αk 2n − 3 .
Equation (4) is maximized when k = n − 1, so the maximal inequality ratio between agents in N c and N f is (αn + n − α − 1)/(2n − 3) which, in the limit as n → ∞ is
When k < n−2 α , agents in N c incur the lowest cost, agents in N $ incur the highest costs, so the inequality ratio is
Equation (6) is maximized when k = 0, so the maximal inequality ratio between agents in N c and N $ is simply (2n − 3 + α)/(n − 1) which, in the limit as n → ∞ is
Therefore, the inequality ratio for a star topology is the maximum between Equations (5) and (7). The lemma follows.
Theorem 2. The NIR for UC network formation game instances N, α when 1 ≤ α < 2 is upper-bounded by 2 as |N | → ∞.
Proof.
Equation (8) also gives the inequality ratio when agents N c ∪ N $ incur a (slightly) higher cost than agents in N f . Since agents in N $ will always incur a cost that is α greater than agents in N f , there will never be a Nash equilibrium in which all agents have exactly the same cost. However, if we take the limit of Equation (8) as n → ∞ we see
so the inequality ratio asymptotically approaches 1.
By Theorem 2 and Proposition 3 we get the following corollary:
Corollary 2. When 1 ≤ α < 2, the UC network formation game admits Nash equilibria that either maximize or minimize inequality but are all equally inefficient.
When 2 ≤ α
Theorem 3. The NIR of UC network formation game instances N, α when 2 ≤ α is upper-bounded by 2 + α.
Proof. Assume that s ∈ S eq is a Nash equilibrium strategy profile with agents x and y being the min-cost and max-cost agents, respectively. The lowest possible cost for any agent to incur is n − 1, which is achieved if every other agent builds a direct link to them. Therefore, c x (s) ≥ n − 1. If x and y are adjacent then c y (s) ≤ α|s y |+(n−1)+ i∈N ℓ Gs (x, i), and the inequality ratio would be c y (s) c x (s) ≤ α|s y | + (n − 1) + i∈N ℓ Gs (x, i) α|s x | + i∈N ℓ Gs (x, i) .
Maximizing this quantity (by assuming a minimal cost of c x (s) = n − 1), we get an inequality ratio of 2 + α|sy| n−1 , which is less than 2 + α, and the claim follows. If, on the other hand, x and y are not adjacent, then it must be that c y (s) ≤ α(1 + |s y |) + (n − 1) + i∈N ℓ Gs (x, i), otherwise y would build a link to x. The inequality ratio would then become
Substituting c x (s) = n − 1 yields the desired bound, completing the proof.
By Lemma 1 it is obvious that the maximal inequality ratio established in Theorem 3 cannot be achieved in a star topology when α ≥ 2 since 2 + α > max{2, 1 + α/2}. Proposition 4. The minimal inequality ratio for UC network formation game instances N, α when 2 ≤ α is 1 as |N | → ∞.
Proof. We know from [FLM + 03] that the star is a Nash equilibrium when α ≥ 2, and we know from the proof of Proposition 3 that there exist star topologies in which the inequality ratio approaches 1 in the limit as n → ∞. The claim follows.
From Theorem 3 and Proposition 4 and the fact (from [FLM + 03]) that star topologies are efficient when α ≥ 2, we get the following corollary:
Corollary 3. For any α ≥ 2, the UC network formation game admits efficient Nash equilibria that achieve perfect equality but only admit inefficient Nash equilibria that have maximal inequality.
The Undirected Bounded Budget Connections Game
The Undirected Bounded Budget Connections (UBBC) network formation game introduced by Ehsani et al. [EFM + 11]. Section 4.1 formally presents the UBBC model and some of its basic properties. Section 4.2 presents our results pertaining to this model.
Model
An instance of the Undirected Bounded Budget Connections network formation game is specified by a tuple N, k where N is a set of n agents, and k = (k 1 , k 2 , . . . , k n ) is a vector of edge endowments (or budgets) with k i > 0 specifying the number of edges that agent i can build; i.e., |s i | ≤ k i . In uniform instances, which we denote by N, k , every agent has the same edge endowment k. Edge formation is unilateral, so a joint strategy profile s = (s 1 , . . . , s n ) induces a graph G s = (N, E S ) where E s = {{i, j} : j ∈ s i }. The cost to an agent i given the joint strategy profile s is defined to be
and the social cost is simply the sum of the agents' individual costs; C(s) = i∈N c i (s).
The following lemma, from Ehsani et al.
[EFM + 11] gives a sufficient condition for testing if a strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium.
Lemma 2 (Ehsani et al. [EFM + 11]).
A UBBC strategy profile s = (s 1 , . . . , s n ) that induces a network G s without parallel edges and a diameter at most 2 is a Nash equilibrium.
Lemma 3 establishes the cost of any socially efficient outcome for uniform instances of the UBBC game.
Lemma 3. The social cost of any socially efficient strategy profile for a uniform UBBC instance N, k is
Proof. Let C min (n, k) be the social cost of an efficient outcome for a uniform UBBC instance with n agents, each with a budget of k edges. When k = k max = (n − 1)/2, the complete graph is the efficient outcome with a social cost of C min (n, k max ) = n(n − 1). Because an individual edge must lie on at least two shortest paths (e.g., the edge {i, j} is on both the i → j and j → i paths), every edge removal contributes at least 2 to the social cost of a network. Hence, C min (n, k) = n(n − 1) + 2n(k max − k). Substituting k max = (n − 1)/2 gives Equation (10), completing the proof.
Finally, we establish a connection between diameter-2 outcomes and social efficiency for uniform UBBC instances. Lemma 4 shows that the social cost of all diameter-2 networks with the same number of edges are equivalent. Proposition 5 equates the social cost of efficient outcomes established in Lemma 3 with the cost of diameter-2 outcomes established in Lemma 4, showing that, in uniform UBBC instances in which there is not a sufficient edge endowment to build the complete graph, strategies that induce diameter-2 networks are socially efficient.
Lemma 4. The social cost of all diameter-2 topologies with a fixed number of m ≤ n(n−1) 2 edges are equivalent, and equals
Proof. Suppose that s diam2 is a joint strategy profile that induces a diameter-2 network G s diam2 with m distinct (i.e., non-parallel) edges. Because G s diam2 has a diameter of 2, we can express the cost incurred by each agent i ∈ N in terms of their degree and their one-and two-hop neighborhoods;
where N k (i) ⊆ N denotes the set of agents in i's k-hop neighborhood and d(i) is the degree of agent i. The substitution of |N 2 (i)| for n in the last line is a requirement of our assumption that the network G s diam2 has a diameter of 2.
With the cost to an individual agent in a diameter-2 network established in Equation (12), we turn to the social cost. Let C(n, m) denote the social cost of a diameter-2 network with n nodes and m edges.
The lemma follows from the fact that Equation (13) depends only on the diameter-2 assumption, the number of nodes, and the number of edges.
Proposition 5. Every uniform UBBC instance N, k with k < (n − 1)/2 has a socially efficient outcome with a diameter of 2.
Proof. From Lemma 3 we know that the social cost of an efficient outcome for a uniform UBBC instance N, k is given by Equation (10), and from Lemma 4 we know that the social cost of any diameter-2 network with m edges is given by Equation (11). A uniform UBBC instance with k edges per agent induces a network with m = nk edges.
Substituting for m and rearranging shows that both Equation (11) and Equation (10) are equivalent. The requirement that k < (n − 1)/2 is a consequence of the fact that when k ≥ (n − 1)/2 then the efficient outcome is the complete graph, which has a diameter of 1.
Results
In the following subsections we prove lower (Section 4.2.1) and upper (Section 4.2.2) bounds on inequality in the UBBC game. We show that the upper-bound is tight for uniform UBBC instances as well, indicating that inequality for the UBBC game is not a matter of heterogeneous (link) endowments but something more fundamental to the UBBC game itself. With respect to efficiency and equality, we show that, if edge budgets are sufficiently small, there exist efficient, Nash equilibrium strategies that achieve maximal inequality while others exist in which every agent incurs the same cost. Accordingly, equality and efficiency are not mutually exclusive in the UBBC model.
Equality in Equilibria
This section establishes cases for which perfect cost equality among agents is achievable.
Recall that, for a strategy profile s to deliver cost equality, the inequality ratio for s is equal to one; i.e., ρ N (s) = 1. Proposition 6 states that equality is achieved by any strategy that induces the complete graph. This result holds for any UBBC instance N, k for which such an outcome is possible.
Proposition 6. Any UBBC strategy profile s that induces a complete graph achieves perfect cost equality.
Proof. In a complete graph, every i ∈ N agent incurs cost c i (s) = n − 1, so ρ N (s) = (n − 1)/(n − 1) = 1.
Complete graphs are not the only ones in which perfect cost equality can be achieved. Theorem 4 considers a family of uniform UBBC instances N, k and shows that so long as each agent has a sufficiently large budget we can construct Nash equilibria strategies s with ρ N (s) = 1.
Theorem 4. For any uniform instance N, k of the UBBC game where k ≥ (n − 1)/4, there exists a Nash equilibrium strategy profile in which every agent incurs the same cost.
The proof of Theorem 4 will rely on the s = strategy specified in Construction 1. (See also Figure 2. ) Construction 1. Given a uniform instance N, k of the UBBC game with N = {0, 1, . . . n − 1} and k ≥ (n − 1)/4, the equality strategy s = is specified such that, for each agent i ∈ N ,
Proof of Theorem 4. Consider the strategy s = specified in Construction 1. In this strategy profile, each agent i's one-hop neighbors are N 1 (i) = {i − k (mod n), . . . , i − 1 (mod n), i + 1 (mod n), . . . , i + k (mod n)}, and i's two-hop neighbors are
The two-hop ball around agent i includes i itself, |N 1 (i)| = 2k one-hop neighbors, and |N 2 (i)| ≤ 2k two-hop neighbors, for a total of (at most) 4k + 1 agents. Since we assumed that n ≤ 4k + 1, it is clear that every agent is within i's two-hop neighborhood. Because this holds for every i ∈ N , it follows that the diameter of the network is 2 and, by Lemma 2, is a Nash equilibrium.
Construction 1 is designed to impose equal costs to every agent. However, it does more than this -by Propostion 7, it is also socially efficient. This demonstrates that there exist socially efficient Nash equilibrium that achieve perfect cost equality for uniform UBBC instances that have sufficiently large budgets.
Proposition 7. For any uniform UBBC instance N, k with k ≥ (n − 1)/4 there exists a Nash equilibrium strategy that achieves perfect cost equality and minimizes the social cost.
Proof. The claim follows immediately from Construction 1 and Proposition 5.
Inequality in Equilibria
In this section we show that, in every Nash equilibrium of the UBBC game (including instances with either homogenous or heterogeneous budgets), the ratio between the lowest and highest costs is strictly less than 2 (Theorem 5). We give a construction (Construction 2) showing that this bound is tight for uniform UBBC instances as well, indicating that inequality for the UBBC game is not a matter of heterogeneous (link) endowments but something more fundamental to the UBBC game itself.
Theorem 5. For any instance N, k of the UBBC game, the Nash Inequality Ratio is strictly less than 2 in every Nash equilibrium.
The proof of Theorem 5 (given formally below) proceeds as follows: We show that in any strategy profile s where the agents with the maximum and minimum costs are adjacent, it holds that ρ N (s) < 2. In order for the min-cost and max-cost agents not to be adjacent in a Nash equilibrium, neither of them stand to reduce their individual costs by switching to a strategy that contains the other agent. This implies that either ρ N (s) is already less than 2 or a maximum cost agent switching to a strategy that includes a link to a minimum cost agent would lead them to a higher cost (i.e., by disconnecting the network). We show in Lemma 5 (presented next) that the latter case cannot be a Nash equilibrium.
Lemma 5. Consider an instance N, k of the UBBC game with a strategy profile s = (s 1 , . . . , s n ) in which there exist (distinct) agents x, y, z ∈ N with x ∈ s z and y / ∈ s z such that: 1. every x → y path in G s contains agent z as an intermediate node, and 2. if z were to swap out x for a connection with agent y then the network will become disconnected (i.e., the edge {z, x} is a bridge).
Then s cannot be a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Denote by X the component of the network containing x that would result from the removal of x from agent z's strategy, and let Y = N \ X ∪ {z} be the set of the remaining agents (not in X) also excluding agent z (see Figure 3 ). We will show that s cannot be a Nash equilibrium by considering the cases |X| > |Y | and |X| ≤ |Y |. But first, notice that every agent i ∈ N contributes at least one edge to G s (since k i ≥ 1) so the component X must contain at least one cycle. For the first case, when |X| > |Y |, there must exist at least one agent j ∈ Y that would strictly improve their strategy by linking into X directly rather than through z, so s cannot be a Nash equilibrium. Such an agent exists because either (i) there is some agent j ∈ Y for which z ∈ s j and they would decrease their cost by |X| ≥ n/2 by swapping their link to z for a link to an agent in X; or (ii) if there are no such agents j ∈ Y with z ∈ s j then it must be the case that j ∈ s z and there exists a cycle in Y (since every agent has at least one edge), and any agent in this cycle could decrease their cost by at least n/2 by linking directly to X (achieved without disconnecting the network).
Second, when |X| ≤ |Y |, there must exist an agent i ∈ X that belongs to a cycle in X and could strictly benefit by linking to Y instead of remaining in the cycle. Such an agent could decrease their cost by at least n/2 by making this swap. Therefore, s cannot be a Nash equilibrium.
With Lemma 5 established, we are in position to prove Theorem 5. We will use the shorthand G − {i, j} to denote the graph G with the edge {i, j} removed.
Proof of Theorem 5. To prove the upper-bound NIR < 2, consider (toward a contradiction) a strategy profile s that is a Nash equilibrium in which c max (s) ≥ 2 · c min (s); i.e., a strategy s such that ρ N (s) ≥ 2. Notice that in this strategy an agent i with c i (s) = c max (s) cannot be directly connected to an agent j with c j (s) = c min (s), because
Step 1
Step 2
Step 3 Figure 4 : Example of the three steps of Construction 2 with n = 11 and k = 3. The dark nodes and edges are those "activated" in the specified step and arrows convey link ownership.
if it were, then i would be connected to the n − 2 other agents via j's shortest paths for a cost that is at most n − 2 more than the cost j is subjected to. That is, if i ∈ s j or j ∈ s i then c i (s) ≤ (n − 2) + c j (s) < 2 · c j (s), where the strict inequality comes from the fact that c j (s) > n − 2, because it is impossible to connect to n − 1 other agents for a cost any less than n − 1. Therefore, in order for c i (s) ≥ 2 · c j (s) it must be the case that j / ∈ s i and i / ∈ s j . This implies that agent i's cost c i (s) must already be at most (n − 2) + c min (s), since switching to a strategy s ′ i that includes j ∈ s ′ i would ensure as much, provided that such a change in strategy does not disconnect the network.
Suppose, on the other hand, that c i (s) > (n − 2) + c j (s) and if i were to switch out some x ∈ s i for a link to j then the network would become disconnected. Therefore it must be that every x → j path includes agent i, in which case the component of G s − {i, x} containing x has a cycle (since every agent has at least one edge). By Lemma 5, such a strategy s cannot be a Nash equilibrium, contradicting our assumption that s is a Nash equilibrium.
To give an example demonstrating that the bound of 2 is tight, consider the wind turbine strategy s wt(1) with agents N = {0, 1, . . . , n − 1} and k = 1 edges per agent. In this strategy profile, s 0 = {1}, s 1 = {2}, and s i = {0} for i = 2, 3, . . . , n−1, resulting in a topology that resembles a wind turbine with agent 0 at the center, agents 1 and 2 forming the base of the "tower", and the remaining agents composing this turbine's "blades". The costs to agent 0 and an arbitrary "blade" agent b ∈ N \ {0, 1, 2} are, respectively, c 0 (s wt(1) ) = c min (s wt(1) ) = n − 1 and c b (s wt(1) ) = c max (s wt(1) ) = 2n − 3. We can see that ρ N (s wt(1) ) < 2 by observing that c max (s wt(1) )/c min (s wt(1) ) = (2n − 3)/(n − 1) < 2.
We remark that although this example strategy s wt(1) is for a uniform instance of the UBBC game, Theorem 5 holds for general UBBC instances in which agents are allowed to have unique budgets.
In Section 4.2.1, it was shown that there are Nash equilibrium strategies for uniform UBBC instances that are both socially efficient and achieve perfect cost equality. In this section we show that there also exist Nash equilibrium strategies for uniform UBBC instances that are efficient yet exacerbate inequality. Together, these results demonstrate that equality and social efficiency are not mutually exclusive.
In this section, we employ a construction for uniform UBBC instances generalizing the s wt(1) strategy that was used to demonstrate that the NIR upper-bound established in Theorem 5 is tight. This strategy, which we refer to as the general wind turbine, denoted s wt(k) , is designed to simultaneously minimize social cost and maximize inequality by depriving certain agents from receiving any links from others. When the edge budget k is sufficiently small (i.e., when 1 ≤ k ≤ (n−1)/2), this strategy is able to achieve the NIR upper-bound. The s wt(k) strategy is specfied in Construction 2 (see also Figure 4) , and is shown to be a Nash equilibrium in Proposition 8 and socially efficient in Proposition 9.
Construction 2. Given a uniform instance N, k of the UBBC game with agents N = {0, 1, . . . , n − 1} and 1 ≤ k ≤ (n − 1)/2, the general wind turbine strategy s wt(k) = (s
n−1 ) is constructed as follows:
1. ∀i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k}, s
Proposition 8. The s wt(k) strategy profile specified in Construction 2 is a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. The claim follows from the observation that s wt(k) creates networks with diameter-2 which (by Lemma 2) is a sufficient condition for Nash equilibrium.
In determining the social cost of the strategy s wt(k) notice that each agent falls into one of three cost "tiers" roughly corresponding to the step of Construction 2 that specifies their individual strategy. Agents N min = {0, 1, . . . , k − 1} incur the minimum costs c min (s wt(k) ) = n − 1 since they are directly connected to every other agent. Agents N max = {2k + 1, 2k + 2, . . . , n − 1} incur the maximum costs, c max (s wt(k) ) = 2(n − 1) − k since they are directly linked with every agent in N min and two-hops away from the rest. Finally, agents in N inter = {k, k+1, . . . , 2k} incur an intermediate costs of c inter (s wt(k) ) = 2(n − k − 1). The cardinality of these partitions are |N min | = k, |N inter | = k + 1, and |N max | = n − 2k − 1, therefore the social cost is C(s wt(k) ) = 2(n 2 − n − kn).
The inequality ratio of the s wt(k) strategy is
When k = o(n), the limit of ρ N (s wt(k) ) as n → ∞ shows us that ρ N (s wt(k) ) → 2, showing that the general wind turbine strategy does indeed maximize the NIR so long as the UBBC instance is sufficiently sparse. In Propositon 9 it is shown that s wt(k) is also efficient, thus establishing the existence of strategies that simultaneously exacerbate inequality while minimizing social cost for every uniform instance N, k of the UBBC game.
Proposition 9. The s wt(k) strategy profile specified in Construction 2 is socially efficient.
Proof. The claim follows from Lemma 3 and that C(s wt(k) ) = 2(n 2 − n − kn) = n(n − 1) + 2n n−1 2 − k .
(In)Equality, Efficiency and Edge Density
Constructions 1 and 2 both produce socially efficient Nash equilibrium outcomes with opposite equality implications. In part, the differences in equality are a consequence of the budget requirements necessitated by each construction. The equality strategy s = of Construction 1 requires (uniform) UBBC instances with budgets that are linear in the number of agents (i.e., k ≥ (n − 1)/4), whereas the s wt(k) strategy of Construction 2 works for any (uniform) UBBC instance with k ≥ 1. By Equation (14), we can see that when k = (n − 1)/4, the inequality ratio of the s wt(k) strategy is 2 − 1 4 as n → ∞. Indeed, for any k = Θ(n), it is easy to see that Construction 2 strategies have an inequality ratio that is below 2 in the limit as n → ∞. 10 Therefore it seems that when resources (i.e., edge budgets) are sufficiently large then inequality becomes less pronounced; but when resources are scarce then high inequality can coincide with socially efficient outcomes.
Conclusion
This paper introduced the Nash Inequality Ratio (NIR) as an instrument to quantify inequality between individual agents by bounding the level of inequality that can exist between them in a Nash equilibrium. We establish bounds on the NIR for the Our analysis of these network formation games gives evidence for a relationship between scarcity (embodied by lower budgets in the UBBC or high edge costs in the UC) and inequality. In the UBBC game, when edges are scarce equilibrium outcomes can maximize inequality, but when edges are more plentiful, the highest level of inequality is not attainable. A similar situation is observed in the UC model where higher edge costs lead to a greater NIR, (explicitly N IR = 1 + α for α < 1, whereas N IR = 2 + α for α ≥ 2), and thus a greater level of inequality can be sustained in equilibrium when edges are expensive.
The NIR is also a useful tool for analyzing the relationship between efficiency and equality. For the UC model this relationship depends on the parameter α. For α < 1, equality and efficiency are independent measures. Yet, for α > 2, a regime with a richer range of possible equilibrium structures (see Proposition 1), it was shown that efficient outcomes do not maximize inequality. Reconciling with the statement on scarcity above, α > 2 supports the greatest level of inequality (N IR = 2+α), yet the maximum possible inequality is not attained by efficient outcomes. For the UBBC model, in contrast, the situation is simpler -when edge budgets are sufficiently small, there are efficient Nash equilibrium strategies that exacerbate inequality but when edge budgets are sufficiently large, inequality can no longer be maximized in equilibrium outcomes.
In summary, the NIR provides a measure of the level of inequality inherent to a game, and a tool to analyze the relationship between equality and efficiency. We believe that an analysis of the NIR will provide interesting insights into many other games as well. 11 As with the PoA, the NIR can be used to establish bounds on another "price" of strategic behavior by answering the question: To what extent should we expect outcomes of distributed decision making to be imbalanced? It may be anarchy, but is it fair ?
